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“Those who are in authority are of two groups: the scholars and the rulers. If they are upright, 
the people will be upright; if they are corrupt, the people will be corrupt.”  
(Ibn Taymiyyah) 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper utilises a political lens in considering the cause for the production of corruption 
and the role of political leadership. Specifically, the notion of personalisation of power as 
advocated by Slater (2003) is adopted to portray how the adoption of neoliberalism ideology 
by an aspiring autocratic leader results in the weakening of the infrastructural power through 
three strategies: packing, rigging and circumventing. We use Perwaja Steel as a case study to 
demonstrate the modus operandi of corruption in a state-owned enterprise in Malaysia.  
 
 
Key words: corruption, neoliberalism, personalisation of power, Perwaja Steel, crony 
capitalism, Malaysia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production  
of corruption  
 
1. Introduction 
Malaysia is often quoted as a good example of a successful moderate Islamic country 
(Borneopost, 28 June 2012). It is ranked as the “37th best country in the world and among the 
top three Asian countries in the global standing” for doing business (The Staronline, 21 
August 2010), and is also a world leader for Islamic finance.  Despite its impressive 
achievements, there are increasing underlying concerns over the last two decades on the 
growth and persistence of corruption in the country, which is not only destroying its 
international reputation as a safe and equitable environment for investment but also 
immensely harming the quality of life of its people (Ibrahim, 2013).  According to the 
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, prosecution of corruption cases in the form of 
bribery, malpractices, abuse of power, criminal breach of trust, and misappropriation of funds 
has increased to 520 cases during 2011 as compared to 432 cases in 2010 (MACC, 2012).  In 
fact, Malaysia is ranked fifth (after China, Russia, Mexico, and India) among the top 10 
countries for illicit capital flight, accounting for almost 40.3 percent of cumulative illicit 
financial flows from developing countries between 2003 to 2012 and ranked third (after 
China and India) among Asian countries in exporting illicit capital to rich countries (Global 
Financial Integrity, 2014). In spite of the major reforms in curbing corruption being launched 
by the past and current governments, it has continued to slide down in the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI)1 ranking from 36th position in 2011 to 50th in 2014 (Global Financial 
Integrity, 2014).2  
                                                          
1 Refer to Transparency International; CPI measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 183 
countries and territories around the world.  
2 Malaysia was ranked as the 53rd in 2013 Transparency International website, 2011 (accessed from 
 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results on 6 March 2015).   
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When Malaysia gained independence in 1957, corruption was hardly an issue but has 
grown since the 1970s. Furthermore, as an Islamic country with Muslim leadership, Malaysia 
is expected to be clean from corruption as Islam strongly forbids and condemns such 
malpractices. It is mentioned in the Hadith: “God cursed the one who pays a bribe, the one 
who takes it and the mediator between the two” (Sahih Muslim)3 and in the Quran (11:85): 
“And O my people! Give full measure and weight in justice and reduce not the things that are 
due to the people, and do not commit mischief in the land, causing corruption.” The question 
that arises is why corruption continues to grow and in fact, escalating to bigger scales in the 
country in recent years? 
The extant literature on corruption has acknowledged that it is a complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon, as it exhibits different forms and functions in diverse contexts, 
with multiple causes and effects (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis and Kim, 2013).  Nevertheless, there 
is mutual agreement that it entails the abuse of public power, roles or resources for private 
benefit (Amundsen, 1999; Johnston, 2005), which may exist at the interface between public 
and private sectors (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) or between international actors and host countries 
(see e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1999; Bayart et al., 1999).  One strand of studies in this area is on 
identifying the root causes and the appropriate preventive measures that can be taken.4  
Discussion on the causes of corruption, which can be attributed to individuals, organizations, 
and institutions, has been grouped in the literature as either the demand-side (referring to the 
taking) or the supply-side (referring to the giving) of corruption (Heimann and Boswell, 
1998; Sikka & Lehman, 2015). This strand of literature further classified the preventive 
solutions into control (aimed at improving legal, electoral, educational and other institutional 
                                                          
3 Cited in Islam message of peace, available at https://islammessageofpeace.wordpress.com/2014/04/29/riba-is-
haraam-for-the-one-who-takes-it-and-the-one-who-pays-it-and-it-is-haraam-to-help-with-it-in-any-way-
whatsoever/ 
4 For a good summary and overview of the literature on the definitions, consequences and causes of corruption, 
see Everett, Neu & Rahaman (2006), Tanzi (1998) and Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener & Søreide 
(2000). 
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systems), exit (alternatives or substitutes available to actors in exiting the situation) and voice 
(respecting a wide array of perspectives, desires, and forms of practical knowledge) strategies 
(see Everett, Neu & Rahaman, 2006; 2007). These studies rightly acknowledged that this 
global problem and its subsequent solution will always be debatable as the field’s actors view 
the problem in different ways due to differences in the ‘‘idiomatic, epistemological, 
ontological and moral correspondences’’ (Rose and Miller, 1992; p. 179). 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the debate on corruption using the lens of 
political power. We argue that the personalisation of power (Slater, 2003) by the political 
leadership imbued with neoliberalism ideology induced the production of corruption.  Using 
one of the largest financial scandals in a state-owned enterprise during the premiership of 
Mahathir Mohamad as a case study, we provide evidence on how an aspired autocratic 
leadership managed to personalised power and weakened the infrastructural apparatus that 
provides the necessary check and balance. This, in turn, facilitated the production of 
corruption on both the demand and supply side.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the notion of 
personalisation of power and mechanisms of personalisation that can be utilised in 
transforming a democratic system into an autocratic regime as well as explain how the 
adoption of neoliberalism ideology may further facilitate the production of corruption. 
Section 3 presents the case study and discusses the modus operandi of the production of 
corruption, as well as the roles of the various actors.  The last section concludes the paper 
with some reflections and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production of corruption 
The fundamental purpose of any democratic institutions is to provide stable patterns of 
popular representation. According to Mann (1988, p.5), one way this can be achieved is by 
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constraining the chief executive's ‘despotic power’, referring to the range of actions that an 
individual leader is empowered to take without routine, institutionalized negotiations with 
other regime members (i.e. the power to decide).  The raison d'etre in authoritarian 
institutions is to supply a regime with the ‘infrastructural power’ (i.e. the power to govern) 
which is necessary if command over potential opposition in civil society and within the 
multiple layers of the state apparatus itself is to be implemented.  In other words, while 
democratic institutions serve to keep the chief executive in check, authoritarian institutions 
serve to keep the opponents under wraps (Mann, 1988).  According to Slater (2003), in semi 
democratic regimes, personalisation of power by any aspiring autocrat requires high levels of 
infiltration into infrastructural powers in order to command the whole country.  Three 
mechanisms that can be utilised by the aspiring autocrat to personalise his/her power include: 
packing, through commandeering the power of an existing institution for personal purposes; 
rigging, through the strategic modification of institutional rules and procedures to forestall 
competition for leadership positions; and circumventing through either the creation of entirely 
new organizations or demand for existing organizations to take on entirely new tasks which 
implies the squandering of at least a portion of a regime's institutional inheritance (Slater, 
2003; p.91).  This process is further made possible in such regimes through the adoption of 
neoliberalism. 
Historically, neoliberalism ideologies as championed by Keynes were associated with 
the role of the state in constraining the mobility of capital and in redistributing wealth for a 
more equitable and just society (Sikka, 2015). However, over time, the idea of the control of 
capital by the state was challenged by Hayek (1944) who argues that market prosperity, 
stability and social justice can be achieved through free market and minimum state 
intervention while still providing minimum provision to those who cannot earn a living in the 
market (Tebble, 2010). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Harvey (2005) observes 
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further expansion of free market competition, mobility of capital and no state intervention in 
the economic sphere in the name of attaining social efficiency.  This rebranding of 
neoliberalism resulted in total loss of state control over organisations and individuals and 
enabled competitive beings to indulge in endless pursuit of private gains and in legitimising 
their activities (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005).  
The embracement of neoliberalism ideologies by western powers is not only confined 
in their own territories but also exported to other developing countries through foreign direct 
investments (Sikka, 2015) and other tools deemed necessary for modernising their 
economies. The neoliberalists have managed to convince the political elites in developing 
countries “that the system is natural, fair and fundamentally better than any realistic 
alternative” (Sklair, 1995; p.98), which in turn either directly or indirectly made them to 
believe in their own inferior socio-political and economic setting as compared to advanced 
nations. This inferiority complex results in political elites in developing countries to 
voluntarily embrace the structures and values of their western counterparts, as opposed to 
other alternatives that may be more suitable in fulfilling local needs, and may also be 
motivated by the obvious private rewards that can be gained through close relationship with 
business elites who needed them in order to survive in the competitive market. This 
symbiotic relationship led to the state becoming nothing more than a façade masking the 
realities of deeply personalised political relations, clientelism (including nepotism and 
cronyism), and political corruption (Hope and Chikulo 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
Adoption of neoliberalism weakened the distinction between public and private which 
dominates the politics of some countries, especially in Africa and some parts of South-East 
Asia.  
Unlike neoliberalist political leaders in democratic countries who are subject to public 
scrutiny if their style of reconfiguring the resources may have negative impact on society, 
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their counterparts in developing countries may use mechanisms of personalisation of power 
to silence their opponents and critics especially when there is a lack or weakened 
infrastructural power (public and legal institutions). 
Another outcome of the adoption of neoliberalism is crony capitalism, a system where 
significant parts of the economy are controlled by the government and political elites who 
will use the power of the state to make decisions in the best interests of a particular set of 
well-connected businesses, rather than in the best interest of the market as a whole (Girling, 
1997; Chang, 1998; Krugman, 1998; Wade, 1998; Haber, 2002). Harvey (2005) succinctly 
defined crony capitalism as corrupt relationships between the state and businesses.  In the 
extreme case, crony capitalism can degenerate into corruption when contracts and 
appointments are awarded to families and friends (nepotism) without merit or transparent 
procurement process.  Similarly, crony capitalism, assists in generating plutocracy, whereby 
a small minority of the wealthiest citizens rule the country (Phillips, 2004) or kleptocracy, 
where the political elites seek to increase their personal wealth often in the pretence of 
providing honest service to the society i.e. corruption rule by theft (Bush, 2006).  While both 
plutocracy and kleptocracy seem to favour the political elites, their closeness with business 
corporations including accounting firms, intensify the production of corruption.  
 
2.1 The Malaysian context  
Malaysian politics has been dominated by the National Front or Barisan Nasional (BN)5 
communal coalition party, with administration of the country being in the hands of the leader 
of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) political party. The country has been 
                                                          
5 BN or the National Front Party was formed in 1973, replacing the Alliance Party which was formed in 1957. It 
consists of three communal political parties: the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC) and the secular United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). There two political opposition 
parties before 1998 are the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP).  
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under six premierships6 including the present one. However, it was Mahathir’s twenty two 
years of premiership that has significantly transformed Malaysian political and socio-
economic landscape that persists till the present day. According to Gomez and Jomo (1999), 
the neoliberal policies and discourses that assist in wealth accumulation and concentration 
through political patronage intensified during Mahathir’s administration.  When he came into 
power in 19817, he was inspired by the success of the four Asian Tigers or Asian Dragons8 
that had developed into advanced and high-income economies through rapid industrialisation. 
Hence, through his ‘Look East’ policy, Mahathir utilized greater state intervention to promote 
heavy industrialization to emulate Japan and South Korea. The state-sponsored and HICOM-
led program of heavy industrialization was mostly implemented in joint-ventures with 
Japanese firms, and the HICOM enterprises were primarily financed by heavy borrowing 
from the Japanese government at very low interest rates (Jomo, 2003).  
In 1984, Mahathir appointed Daim Zainuddin, a successful businessman and a close 
friend, as his economic advisor.  Under the Malaysian Incorporation Policy, significant 
economic policy reversals which include regressive fiscal (tax and spending) reforms, more 
stringent public expenditure cuts, privatization, deregulation, and financial liberalization were 
implemented (Jomo, 2003).  This policy and the earlier National Economic Policy (NEP),9 
succeeded in creating a small group of super-rich bumiputra (indigenous group) class but 
failed to achieve its main objective of reducing economic inequalities among the indigenous 
                                                          
6 Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1969), Abdul Razak (1969-1976), Hussein Onn (1976-1981), Mahathir 
Mohammad (1981-2003), Abdullah Badawi (2003-2009) and Najib Razak (2009 to present).   
7 His ascend to power was just after Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister of Britain in 1979 and 
Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in 1980, both of whom are known to be the 
champions of neoliberalism doctrine. 
8 This term is used to refer to the highly free and developed economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. 
9 Before 1969, the ruling party adopted a liberal agenda with minimal state intervention which resulted in 
excessive accumulation of wealth by the Chinese ethnic group.  Frustrated with unequal wealth distribution 
coupled with violation of Islamic principles in social and political policies, sparked the May 13 ethnic riot in 
1969 (Hooker and Othman, 2003). Following the riot, Abdul Razak introduced the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), a twenty-year social re-engineering and affirmative action plan to eliminate the identification with 
economic function as well as to increase enterprise ownership by the bumiputra (indigenous group).  
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group; in fact it actually widened social inequality (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Other reports 
highlighted that Malaysia’s level of inequality was among the highest reported in the region, 
with a Gini coefficient10 of 0.49 during 2000 (Netto, 2004), while at the same time the rich 
are getting richer in Malaysia. The widespread poverty in Malay dominated states caused 
some UMNO supporters to question the policies that focused on privatisation and heavy 
industries run by favoured businessmen (Saw and Kesavapany, 2006), including those with 
family and friendship ties. To ease the friction, the ruling party created a ‘new middle-class’ 
Malay professionals (Rahman, 2002) and this frustrated some of the Malay elite groups who 
monopolised most of the country’s concessions or rents, causing them to switch their loyalty 
from UMNO to the opposition party, the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (Malaysian Justice Party) led 
by Anwar Ibrahim.11  
From 1985 onwards, business regulation for inter-ethnic redistribution purposes as 
required under the NEP and the Industrial Coordination Act 1975, was abandoned. This 
further intensification of political patronage with certain bumiputra and non-bumiputra 
businessmen do not only brought mutual benefits to the two groups but also seen as important 
for the development of business interest (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). When the first recession 
hit in 1985-1987, many Malaysian corporations, especially those associated with the regime’s 
‘cronies’, were very highly leveraged but they were protected and supported through 
government bailouts to ensure that Mahathir achieved his goals of making Malaysia a fully-
developed industrial country through his Vision 2020 policy (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).   
When the 1997 financial crisis erupted, Mahathir was once again anxious to protect and 
organize bail-outs for the cronies, which led critics to charge that the regime’s cronies were 
                                                          
10 Gini coefficient: a measurement used to evaluate income inequality where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1.0 
indicates perfect inequality (Worldpress.org).  
11 He was the former Finance Minister, deputy PM and UMNO deputy president who was punished and 
removed from government office in 1998 and imprisoned by Mahathir for sexual impropriety allegations and 
other corruption charges. He is currently serving a 5 year-term after being implicated again for sodomy charge 
under PM Najib’s administration. 
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doubly blessed – first by benefiting from privatization in the 1980s, and then by walking 
away unscathed from their debts and liabilities through bail-outs using public funds (Jomo, 
2003). Mahathir also has an obsession for mega-projects and it was during his time that the 
Petronas Twin Towers, KLIA, Putrajaya and Sepang Grand Prix Circuit were developed. 
Critics at that time expressed doubts that the country’s resources had been put to the best and 
most productive use and some economists were concerned on the financial implications (huge 
government debts) and depleted natural resources for the next generation of Malaysians 
(Netto, 1999) as a result of these mega ventures.   
In short, under Mahathir, Malaysia experienced 20 years of privatizing profits and 
profitable assets and socializing of losses and liabilities (Jomo, 2003).  The perpetrators were 
not made accountable and overly protected which may be attributed to the personalization of 
power by the leadership. Leong (1992, p. 243) commented that “… under the Mahathir 
administration, the Cabinet is no longer used as a forum, but rather as a rubber-stamp 
institution that gives legitimacy to government policies.” Similarly, Leigh (2001, p.7) 
succinctly commented: 
“…the most enduring consequence of the Mahathir era has been a deliberate and 
decisive weakening of Malaysia's institutions, including the judiciary, the royalty, the 
independent civil service, the parliament, the electoral system and....The institutions of 
governance are much weaker, and rulership has been personalized.”  
 
The personalisation of power was achieved by packing the most important posts in the 
cabinet and institutional infrastructure with loyalists, and he himself subsuming another two 
vital posts, home minister and finance minister in 1998. Rigging of the political party’s 
procedures facilitated his personal domination of the hegemonic political organization 
(Slater, 2003) and in centralising the ruling party’s power in a few executives’ hands (Gomez, 
2004; Saw and Kesavapany, 2006).  Circumvention was used in silencing and later ousting 
the then Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, who had opposed to bail-outs using public 
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funds.12 He appointed Daim as the ‘virtual finance minister’ (Erickson and Shameen, 1998) 
and also allowed himself direct control over a variety of discretionary funds to prepare 
strategic bailouts for his key allies in the corporate sector (Slater, 2003).  
In the next section we present a case as evidence on how neoliberalism ideology and 
personalisation of power by a political leader facilitated the production of corruption in a 
state-owned enterprise. The research was conducted through scrutinizing newspaper articles, 
website commentaries, books and journal articles related to the company and major actors. 
Although there are other scandals involving state-owned companies in Malaysia, we chose 
Perwaja Steel as our case as it was one of the largest scandals at a time when personalisation 
of power had just started to develop.  
 
3. Production of corruption in Perwaja Steel 
3.1 Company background 
Perwaja Terengganu was formed on 22 April 1982 with a paid up capital of RM 250 million 
as a joint-venture between the government agency, Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
(Hicom Ltd) and Nippon Steel Corp.13 The project was meant to be the crowning jewel of the 
industrialization drive under Mahathir’s Look East policy. The Japanese company built a 
billet-making plant and a direct-reduction facility to smelt ore into hot briquetted iron based 
on a new technology. The direct-reduction plant never functioned properly and by 1986, the 
joint-venture project accumulated losses of RM 131 million. This was attributed to 
management problems and appreciation of the Japanese yen which affected its interest 
payments on a yen loan totaling RM 815 million (The Malay Mail, 10 February 2004). In 
                                                          
12 Mahathir and Daim instructed the Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim to suspend KLSE rules to allow the 
leading crony UEM-Renong conglomerate a bailout. That move caused the stock market capitalization to fall by 
RM 70 billion, or 20 percent, in three days in November 1997 (Jomo, 2003). These policy divergences between 
Mahathir and Anwar had caused the latter a heavy price. In 1998, Anwar was imprisoned for five years on 
sodomy allegation. 
13 Hicom owned 51%, Nippon 30% and Terengganu state government 19%. 
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1987, Nippon Steel gave up its 30 percent stake in the company and Hicom was stripped of 
its 51 percent stake, ending with the Malaysian government owning 81% of Perwaja 
Terengganu's equity and 19% held by the Terengganu state government. In 1987, Mahathir 
handpicked his trusted associate, Eric Chia,14 to spend six months in the company to report 
why the project was failing. In 1988, Eric was formally appointed as the managing director of 
Perwaja Teregganu and during this period, more than 10 proposals were received by the 
government to turn the RM 1.2 billion plant into a profitable venture but it was left to become 
insolvent in 1988.  
Based on a 10-year plan and with fresh capital from government funding and 
commercial loans from Bank Bumiputra15 (RM 860 million) and the Employee Provident 
Fund (EPF-RM 130 million), a new company, Perwaja Steel was set up in 1989. Eric and his 
board of directors, who included representatives from the Finance Ministry, were tasked with 
rehabilitating the project. In 1991, the company recorded its first accounting profit and 
Mahathir used the event to silence critics on his aggressive mega projects adventure. In 1995, 
Eric resigned abruptly from the company16 and a year later, a pre-tax loss of RM 376.54 
million was reported, claimed to be due to the expansion project involving the building of a 
rolling mill. Despite the loss, the company managed to secure a second syndicated loan of 
RM 600 million approved by EPF in 1996. When Eric left the company in 1995, it had 
accumulated RM 10 billion in debts and losses, involving current liabilities of RM 9.26 
million, long-term loans of RM 6.013 billion, and losses amounting to RM 2.985 billion 
                                                          
14 He is a Singapore-born Chinese entrepreneur who became a successful and prominent businessman in 
Malaysia. He came to Malaysia at the age of 23 and managed United Motor Works (UMW) set up by his father. 
The company became the country’s largest engineering group. He established strong friendship with Mahathir 
who supported his business through major government contracts. In 1987, he helped rescue a haulage and 
logistic company set up by Mahathir. He was nicknamed Mr Fixit as he is often called upon to help the political 
elites when their businesses are in trouble (The Staronline, June 25, 2008).  
15 UMNO is a major shareholder of the bank. 
16 In an interview after being released from conviction, he revealed that he had received a letter from a senior 
official asking him to resign due to ill health. 
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(News Straits Times, 28 March 2003).  Table 1 presents the status of the company’s financial 
position in 1995. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Perwaja Finances in 1995 
 
Indebted     
Major Malaysian lenders to Perwaja RM million  Yr of Maturity 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers (syndicated loan) 135  2003 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 430  2004 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 270  2007 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600  2000 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd. 600  2002 
Employees Provident Fund 710  2001 
Bills to pay    
Perwaja by the numbers:    
 End of 1998  End of 1997 
Direct loans owed to the government RM 4,015m  RM 3,174m 
Outstanding loans guaranteed by government (Local & Foreign) RM 5,122m  RM 5,682m 
Major Foreign Lenders to Perwaja    
 RM million  Yr of Maturity 
IBJ Leasing Services (Panama) Inc. 199.3  2003 
Standard Chartered Bank (Labuan) 1,520  2002 
Japanese Banking Consortium 685.5  2003 
 
Source: Lopez (2000) based on Malaysian government sources. 
 
 
Anwar Ibrahim, the former Finance Minister, instructed an independent audit firm, 
Coopers and Lybrand to examine Perwaja Terengganu’s 1988 insolvency status.  Following 
the report received from the audit firm, Anwar disclosed in parliament that the actual loss was 
RM 2.9 billion and made a police report.  A government probe order was then issued on 10 
April 1996 and the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA, now known as Malaysian Anti-
Corruption Commission (MACC)) started investigating the company’s audited report for 
possible malpractices which had contributed to the loss. Furthermore, the new management 
of Perwaja Steel prepared an internal report where it alleged among others, the following: 
inaccurate accounting records, unauthorised contracts amounting to hundreds of millions of 
ringgit, misappropriation of funds, dubious maintenance contracts amounting to RM 292 
14 
million (including a contract amount of RM 200,000 per month to a company for gardening, 
cleaning and vehicle maintenance), and award of RM 957 million contract to companies of a 
long time associate of Eric Chia (WTF, 15 December 2011). 
On 16 June 1997, Perwaja Steel was handed over to two cronies: Abu Sahid of Maju 
Holdings, who took a 51% stake saw it as an opportunity to be known as a steel man, and the 
Pheng family of Kinsteel who took over the remaining to thwart threat to their own steel 
operations business. In 2008, Perwaja Holdings was listed on the main board of Bursa 
Malaysia and Perwaja Steel became its 100% subsidiary. EPF filed suit against Perwaja Steel 
for RM 4.5 billion and it went into receivership in December 2014. Table 2 illustrates the 
chronology of the emergence & demise of Perwaja Steel. 
 
Table 2 Chronology of the Emergence & Demise of Perwaja Steel 
1982 1987 & 1988 1989 1995 & 1996 1997 2008 2014 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja 
Terengganu 
Perwaja Steel 
MD –Eric 
Chia 
Perwaja Steel 
Eric Chia 
resigned in 
1995 
Perwaja Steel 
 
Perwaja Steel 
became 100% 
subsidiary of 
Perwaja Bhd 
Perwaja 
Steel went 
into 
receivership 
Hicom 
(51%), 
Nippon 
(30%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Federal govt. 
(81%) & 
Terengganu 
state govt. 
(19%) 
Maju 
Holdings 
(51%) & 
Kinsteel 
(49%) 
 
Kinsteel 
owns 37% of 
Perwaja Bhd 
 
RM 250m 
paid-up 
capital & 
RM 500m 
loan from 
Export-
Import 
Bank of 
Japan 
 
Reported 
loss of RM 
131m in 
1986 & in 
1988 
reported 
total 
accumulated 
loss of RM 
1.2b & 
became 
insolvent in 
1988 
New 
company set 
up through 
govt. funding 
& loans from 
Bank 
Bumiputra 
(RM860 m) 
and EPF 
(RM130 
million) 
 
Reported pre-
tax loss of RM 
376.54m in 
1996. Secured 
funding of RM 
600m loan 
from EPF.  
Total 
accumulated 
losses of RM 
2.5b, long-term 
loans of RM 6b 
& current 
liabilities of 
RM 1b 
 Perwaja Bhd 
listed on 
main board of 
Bursa 
Malaysia 
EPF filed 
suit for RM 
4.5b 
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Mahathir’s neoliberalism ideology of Malaysia Incorporation (Jomo, 2003) made him 
pursue an aggressive industrialization and privatisation agenda with the rhetoric of matching 
the other Asian Tigers regardless of the impact on the democratic process. Despite the project 
showing many signs of failure, he kept injecting more public funds into the ‘pet’ project as he 
perceive it as too important to fail to safe his ego and also to ward off increasing criticisms 
from his opponents. He turned to neoliberalist cronies for advice and support and in return 
promised protecting their interests by utilizing the infrastructural power. This supports the 
arguments by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) and Sikka (2015) that neoliberalism ideology 
legitimises competitive beings to indulge in endless pursuit as sign of success.  
 
3.2 Deployment of power and production of corruption 
Although the ACA’s probe on Perwaja Steel started in 1996, no one had been implicated until 
9th October 2004, when Eric Chia was arrested and charged for criminal breach of trust 
during the premiership of Abdullah Badawi. Eric was alleged to have dishonestly authorised 
payment of RM 76.4 million to the account of Frilsham Enterprise Incorporated (Frilsham) 
with the American Express Bank Ltd in Hong Kong for technical assistance agreement 
(TAA) provided to the Perwaja plant by a Japanese company, NKK Corporation, when in fact 
no such payments were due to these companies.  He was also alleged to have instructed 
payment of the same amount without the approval of the board of directors nor the tendering 
committee of the Perwaja Rolling Mill and Development.  The offence was alleged to have 
been committed in his capacity as the managing director of Perwaja Steel between 4th 
November 1993 and 22nd February 1994.  
The ACA's failure to wrap up its investigation sooner and nab the perpetrators 
responsible for the RM 10 billion staggering losses at Perwaja Steel has been criticized by 
members of both the opposition and the ruling National Front (BN) coalition. Unlike in most 
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countries, the ACA was under the Prime Minister’s Department which thus diminishes its 
power to act independently since investigation of the case began during Mahathir’s 
premiership. The timing of the arrest and allegation also raised further questions as Eric’s 
detention was not related to the huge debt and losses suffered by the company to bring the 
perpetrators to justice but rather a political ploy ahead of the 2004 general election.  
 
Fig. 1. Deployment of Power and Production of Corruption  
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This suggests that Mahathir has succeeded in personalising his power by diverting decision-
making authority on major policy issues to the Prime Minister's Department through utilising 
the packing and circumventing strategies in the case of the ACA and utilising the rigging 
strategy in determining his successors (i.e. Abdullah Badawi & also the current PM, Najib 
Razak) to ensure that he will not be implicated.  During the court proceedings, the weak 
internal control system and the working of a covert power became more apparent.  Figure 1 
illustrates the main actors and their roles in the case. 
The former senior group general manager, Ahmad Zaini, in his comments on the case 
stated that although the TAA was meant to be free, the payment was made to Frilsham 
Enterprise’s account in the American Express Bank in Hong Kong following Eric Chia’s 
approval (News Straits Times, 18 September 2004). In his financial report, Ahmad Zaini went 
on to state that the general manager of NKK Corporation, N. Otani, had confirmed in writing 
in a letter dated 11 October 1995 that Frilsham was not its associate company, hence NKK’s 
Otani did not sign any payment request letter but this letter was not produced in court. On the 
contrary, Akram Che Ayub, the former group senior operations manager, stated that the TAA 
was not free and that the request for payments should be staggered rather than paid in one 
lump sum.  A request letter for the payment bearing the signature of Otani dated 17 February 
1994 was confirmed by Akram to be different from that on the TAA and the addendum 
(News Straits Times, 14 August 2004). A letter instructing one lump sum payment to be 
remitted to Frislham’s account with the American Express Bank Ltd in Hong Kong had been 
made through Bank Bumiputera in Malaysia on 22 February 1994 (The Malay Mail, 14 
August 2004). Lim Chaing Cheah, a former corporate director who instructed the payment, 
stated that he was ordered by Eric to proceed with it despite the absence of any supporting 
documents to justify the said payment.  Lim further pointed out that it was customary in the 
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company that all payments17 made should first be authorised by Eric and countersigned by 
him. Lim said:  
“For example when a request for payment comes from overseas, we notify the 
managing director’s people. Once approval is given, we get the finance and 
accounting department to process it” (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004). 
 
Interestingly, the demised Arthur Andersen, the company’s external auditor, had all along 
issued ‘unqualified’ audit report until the company became insolvent.  The clean audit report 
on the company’s financial position had been presented to the board of directors on 31 March 
1994 and was approved during the annual general meeting (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004).  
The responsibilities of Perwaja Steel’s corporate directors surpassed four pertinent 
departments viz. finance and accounting, administrative, corporate banking and management 
information system (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004), hence suggesting weak internal control 
system and poor corporate governance. The fact that the external auditor failed to probe 
further on the missing document suggests either incompetency or some involvement in the 
malpractice. 
However, a pertinent question in all this is the rationale of a Japanese company (NKK) 
requesting payments for its services to be made to the bank account of its associate company 
(Frilsham) in Hong Kong rather than directly to it. The scandal worsened when NKK was 
later found to be non-existent (The Malay Mail, 10 February, 2004) and that Frilsham’s 
account at American Express Bank in Hong Kong was closed on 28th July 1994 i.e. about five 
months after the RM 76.4 million was paid into the account (News Straits Times, 17 
September 2004). Australasian Business Intelligence (23 May 2002) reported that the 
payment appeared to have benefitted Sakyo Corporation, a company associated with Shahril, 
                                                          
17 Payments for projects, constructions of plants, purchasing of raw materials and services that include 
technological consultancy (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004). 
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the son of Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir,18 a crony of Mahathir who was also closely linked to 
Eric Chia. While the use of Frilsham as an intermediary company or SPV may be deemed to 
be a cover up, this was made possible as Hong Kong is considered as one of the most lenient 
countries with loose regulations. In other words, the production of corrupt transactions and 
the choice of a safe haven to conceal the fraudulent act were the consequence of the adopted 
neoliberalism ideology, facilitated by the personalization of power that has weakened the 
various check and balance infrastructures in Malaysia. 
The court proceedings further revealed of a covert power in action. Eric, in a letter 
addressed to the Chairman of Perwaja Steel, Zainal Abidin Sulong, in the minutes of the 
board’s meeting held on 30 March 1996, clearly stated that: (1) he was answerable only to the 
Prime Minister (PM-Mahathir); (2) he was mandated by the PM to operate Perwaja as if it 
belonged to him; (3) he implemented projects only after the PM had granted approval; (4) he 
received no salary or benefits from Perwaja during his service; and (5) his service as 
managing director in Perwaja is determined by the PM.  This clearly indicates Mahathir’s 
success in creating loyalist cronies like Eric who is willing to implicate himself rather than to 
risk his ‘friendship’ with Mahathir.  
According to the minutes of the board of directors meeting on 4 July 1993, it was 
reported that Eric informed the board that he had met Anwar Ibrahim, the Finance Minister 
the day before (i.e. 3 July 1993) who agreed to waive a circular19 dated 6 August 1985 which 
requires all companies under the government to get approval for any tenders amounting RM 
15 million and above.  Eric also suggested for the formation of a tendering committee20 
comprising of himself as the chairman together with the other two directors, Nik Mohamad 
Affandi and Zubir Embong. The board unanimously approved the procedure for the 
                                                          
18 He was a former engineer with Malaysian Telecommunication Department who retired in 1971 and started a 
family control company, Sapura Holdings, which bought UMW from Eric Chia.  
19 The Circular: is a strict financial guideline which requires companies in which the Government owns at least 
51% equity, to keep the MOF informed on projects, tenders, and purchases at the initial stage of negotiations. 
20 The tender committee needs to approve all contracts or purchase of RM 15 million or above. 
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purchases and awards of contracts as directed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and proposal 
for the tendering committee.  The board’s chairman, Zainal Abidin Sulong, further reported 
that the board also approved Eric to conclude purchases and contracts without referring to the 
tendering committee for consumable goods like electrodes, scrap, iron ore, lubricants, etc., 
and any contracts of RM 5 million and below. Ironically, another former board director who 
was also the MOF’s representative on the board, Nik Mohd Affandi Nik Yusoff, told the 
court that the MOF had never forced the company to activate its tendering committee and he 
also disagreed with some parts of the minutes of meeting which stated that the MOF had 
agreed to exempt the company from seeking approval for purchases and contracts of RM 15 
million and above.  These are not the comments of equal parties to a commercial transaction, 
hence implying a calculated paternalism.  Furthermore, evidence shows all these liberal 
gestures were being carefully recorded as part of an accounting process directed at securing 
contracts. In a nutshell, Mahathir has not only managed to pack the company with loyalists 
but more importantly, to circumvent the infrastructural power of the MOF by frustrating the 
rules in place. The establishment of the ad hoc National Economic Action Council, headed by 
Mahathir’s closest ally, Daim, was further evidence of circumvention of Anwar's power in 
restraining the usage of public funds to rescue and support cronies in trouble. 
When the Anti-Corruption Agency’s (ACA) investigating officer, Han Chee Rull, was 
asked by the court if he had (1) obtained recorded statement from the PM, (2) seen the 
correspondence between Eric Chia and the PM, (3) knew about the PM’s visit to the NKK’s 
plant in Japan before the TAA was signed, and (4) Eric Chia’s three suits that had been filed 
against NKK Corporation, Lim Guan Eng and The Malay Mail, he confirmed that no 
recorded statement was taken from Mahathir and that he was unaware of the other three 
issues.  The admission of unawareness on the many incidents related to the accused Eric Chia 
by the ACA investigating officer responsible in handling the case, implied some form of 
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subjugation and control of the course of justice by Mahathir. As mentioned earlier, the 
packing and circumvention strategies by locating the ACA under the PM’s Department 
constrain the effectiveness of the agency to act independently and to remain subservient to 
the leadership. 
Rais Yatim, the then Minister in the PM’s Department, reported that the Swiss 
Government was prepared to cooperate with the Malaysian authorities in probing the missing 
Perwaja Steel’s money in Swiss bank accounts (The Malay Mail, 3 August 2004) and that the 
ACA, under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill 2002, can make an official 
request to freeze the bank accounts of those allegedly involved in the scandal.  He further 
reported that 3 senior ACA officers went to Zurich and Japan to find the last piece of 
evidence to wrap up the investigations.  However, the ACA officers claimed that they did not 
get cooperation from the Zurich bank and the Japanese banking authorities, hence the vital 
evidence could not be sought. Rais’s comments on Mahathir’s relative invisibility in the case 
ensured he was able to maintain friendly ‘relations’ with the powerful leader of the ruling 
party. The PM’s office is packed with loyalists and it serves as the nerve centre in rewarding 
loyalists and punishing opponents.  
In 2007, Eric was acquitted of the charges by the Judge, Akhtar Tahir, who said that the 
prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case against Eric on two grounds. Firstly, 
failure to call two material witnesses, former secretary of Perwaja Steel, Durai Rajasingam, 
and the five Japanese witnesses including the director of NKK Corporation, N. Otani. The 
Judge raised his concerns on the uncalled witnesses respectively, saying: 
 
“...Yet the prosecution never called him [Rajasingam]. The question is why? I see 
nothing to say that he would be a hostile witness or give evidence against them.........I 
wonder whether it was the Japanese witnesses who were reluctant or the prosecution 
was the one reluctant to bring them here..” (Thestaronline, 27 June 2007). 
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Secondly, the conflicts in the tendering documents – the prosecution insisted that the TAA 
was free but when tendering its document at the trial, they stated the agreements would be 
effective upon receiving the first payment while NKK Corporation’s document stated the 
amount should be paid in one lump sum. The release of Eric Chia from all the criminal 
breach of trust charges on 26 June 2007 (Thestaronline, 27 June 2007) provided some form 
of comfort for the other perpetrators who have links with political patronage as they will 
escape the law. The judiciary was one of the earliest (since 1988) institutions packed by 
Mahathir in order to enhance his infrastructural power and Eric’s trial was seen by critics as 
another ‘wayang’ (theatrical act).   
The Perwaja Steel fraud case which dragged for 11 years (from 1996 until 2007) was 
indeed one of the country’s longest investigations.  The involvement of foreign institutions 
and powerful individuals was blamed for the case being dragged for so long.  While this 
might be true due to the nature of the case, it may also be seen as a tactic used by the relevant 
parties as a massive cover up exercise hoping that people will forget about it with the passing 
of time (Grenfell, 1979). Table 3 summarises the chronology of events on the role of 
Mahathir and his cronies in the production of corruption and how he used the state apparatus 
and his loyal cronies and other political elites to ensure he was never implicated nor referred 
to in the Perwaja Steel fiasco. 
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Table 3 Chronology of events of the Perwaja debacle 
 
Year Events Neoliberalism & Personalisation of power by an autocrat 
1982 Perwaja Terengganu was established as a joint 
venture between the government and Nippon 
Steel Corp of Japan in the east coast of 
Malaysia although steel was consumed in huge 
volumes in the west coast, which clearly is a 
recipe for disaster. 
 
Mahathir justified his decision by claiming 
that he was taking industrialisation to the east 
coast of Malaysia to help develop the state. 
1986 Perwaja Terengganu accumulated losses of RM 
131 million.  
Mahathir blamed it on appreciation of the yen 
and not on poor management skills of his 
inexperienced cronies in the steel sector.  
 
1987 Eric Chia mandated to investigate why the 
project failed.  
Mahathir used Eric as his Mr Fixit to help 
rescue his failing pet project.  
 
1988 Perwaja Terengganu went into solvency. 
 
Mahathir did not want to admit failure of his 
project, hence rejected proposals to turn 
around the company to profitable venture.  
 
1988 Perwaja Steel was established and Eric was 
appointed as managing director. 
 
Mahathir used one of the state agencies, EPF 
to provide syndicated loan to help Eric 
managed the new company. Representatives 
from MOF sat on the board of the company. 
 
1991 Perwaja Steel recorded its first profit. 
 
Mahathir used the event to justify that his 
action in appointing Eric to manage his new 
project was correct to ward off criticisms on 
his mega projects. 
 
1995 Eric Chia resigned from Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir ordered Eric to resign.  
 
1996 Perwaja Steel reported a pre-tax loss of RM 
376.54 million. 
 
Mahathir used EPF for the second time to 
provide syndicated loan. 
1996 Anwar Ibrahim disclosed in parliament 
Perwaja’s actual loss to be RM2.9 billion based 
on the report by Coopers & Lybrand who was 
tasked to investigate Perwaja Terengganu’s 
insolvency status. 
 
Anwar instructed ACA to begin investigation 
on the company’s audited report by Arthur 
Andersen for possible malpractices and fraud 
that have contributed to the loss.  
1997 Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd bought 51% stake in 
Perwaja Steel. 
 
Mahathir helped another of his Malay crony, 
Abu Sahid to acquire the business and only in 
2003 the deal was inked and for the company 
to assume control. 
 
1998 Anwar Ibrahim was expelled from the 
government as he was against injecting public 
funds on failing projects and those that do not 
benefit society. 
 
Mahathir used the judiciary institution to 
imprison Anwar for sodomy allegation and 
other corruption charges. 
2004  Eric was arrested and charged of criminal 
breach of trust involving RM 76.4 million.  
 
Abdullah Badawi who superseded Mahathir 
used Eric’s detention as a political ploy ahead 
of the 2004’s general election rather than 
actually bringing the culprit to justice. 
 
2007 Eric was acquitted by the judge.  
 
The prosecution team failed to bring the key 
witnesses and produced conflicting 
documents causing the case to be dropped. 
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4. Reflections and conclusion 
Combating corruption on both the demand and supply side requires understanding of the 
context and logic of the actors conducting the affairs in modern societies. In developing 
countries, economic policies and actions are often in the hands of the political elites and the 
doctrine of neoliberalism has been a convenient vehicle in legitimising their exercise of 
power in turning the state’s assets into private enterprises and in deregulating economic 
activities, as well as in empowering themselves and their cronies in defending their decisions 
and outcomes. The main criticism on the symbiotic relationship between the political elites 
and business cronies is the excessive misuse of power to the degree that it corrupts the 
economic and political principles of public service (Sikka, 2008; Bakre, 2008). Hence, any 
effort at curbing corruption requires scrutiny of the political ambition and democratic spirit of 
the ‘tone at the top’. When a country is allowed to be run by an increasingly authoritarian 
personality without constraints on the despotic power, then the country’s institutional 
infrastructure that provides the check and balance may be weakened by the aspiring autocrat 
through various means of personalisation of power (Slater, 2003).  
We demonstrate, using Perwaja Steel as a case study, how a political leader’s form of 
neoliberalism ideology helped him pursue his aggressive industrialization agenda by turning 
to his cronies and political loyalists to help realize his ambitions and visions. He facilitated 
political elites to form a small interlocking group to accumulate wealth either individually or 
collectively. Such interlocking state cannot be maintained in competitive market but when 
political elites and crony capitalists are entwined, then corrupt and incompetent political 
elites can maintain the small-hub network by colluding through the awards of tenders or 
projects within their networks. More importantly, we show how personalization of power 
through the strategies of packing, rigging and circumventing have weakened the institutional 
infrastructure such as the judiciary, anti-corruption agencies, and police, that provides the 
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check and balance in protecting public interest.  
The nature of fraudulent in a state-owned company is understandably different than in 
public or family owned business. The failure and scandals of state-owned companies in 
Malaysia have escalated since the 1980s (Malaysian Airlines, Port Klang Free Zone, etc.) and 
this can be attributed to the ‘bossism’ political leadership and the control of the economic 
machinery. The latest scandal in 2015 is the 1MDB, a sovereign wealth fund set up in 2009 
by the current Prime Minister, Najib.  All these scandals share the same modus operandi and 
if the root of the problem i.e. the autocratic leadership is not tackled, then corruption in the 
country will continue.  
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, we present an in-depth analysis of only 
one case study of a failed state-owned company in Malaysia. Future studies can adopt 
multiple-case study method to show the commonality and differences of the main actors, 
collaborators and institutions involved in the production of corruption. Secondly, our case 
study analysis relies on secondary data and future research may use interviews with members 
of political parties, lawyers, accountants, and this will provide better voices on the corruption 
problem.  Thirdly, we did not discuss the preventive strategies suitable for the country and 
hence, future studies may consider this. Fourthly, as a multiracial and multi-religious nation, 
the underlying philosophical and ethical doctrines for conducting economic activities other 
than neoliberalism may be considered.  
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